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mobility, migrant labor force working in South African gold mines, and a cycle of poverty 
characterize Lesotho. This paper develops a general equilibrium model for Lesotho 
specifying these absorbing economic characteristics. We are particularly interested in 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Economic development is a process, which transforms a society in such a way that it 
raises the Standard of Living, very broadly conceived, for a large proportion of its 
members.
1 Lesotho provides an example of a society with a high unemployment rate 
and a low standard of living: in 2002, its annual per capita income was US$ 502, and it 
ranked 124
th out of 179 on the Human Development Index. Lesotho is a country 
characterized by a small population (2.04 million in 2001), large scale unemployment, 
and potentially no barriers to inflow of foreign capital.
2  The government of Lesotho did 
not implement free primary education until the year 2000 indicating the low level of 
human capital development in the country.
3 Many, including Hassan (2002), characterize 
Lesotho’s low quality of education as one of the obstacles to sustainable development. 
 
1 See Amartya Sen (1987) on the Standard of Living. 
2  In addition to large-scale unemployment, Lesotho also exhibits underemployment and disguised 
unemployment. 
3 See World Bank (2001, p 23) 
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In addition to the contribution by Plath, Holland, and Carvalho (1987), in a recent 
World Bank Study, a 50 sector SAM (Social Accounting Matrix) was constructed as the 
basis of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.
4 Despite IMF’s year-round 
contribution of a staff member to the Central Statistical Office in Maseru, Lesotho, the 
available data is both sparse and highly unreliable. A CGE model calibrated to a SAM 
based on such unreliable data, and policy change simulations based thereupon, do not 
provide much guidance for a comprehensive understanding of the economic forces that 
produce the social outcomes (of general equilibrium) which, as equilibria, are 
characterized by inertia. 
In spite of these shortcomings, it is important to note that the World Bank Study 
does provide insights into some of the key features characterizing the general 
equilibrium (inertial) social outcome. The three most significant features in this regard 
are the employment of and remittances from Lesotho workers in South African gold 
mines, the severe shortage of skilled domestic workers and the revenues from Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project. We take advantage of these insights, and construct a 
theoretical, as distinct from computable, general equilibrium model of Lesotho so as to 
identify the sources of inertia in the economy and how they may be overcome. 
The shadow wage rate in Lesotho is near zero, so that from an economic standpoint, 
it has an unlimited supply of labor. If the unskilled labor force in Lesotho were to 
decline slightly, the GNP of the country would fall only marginally, if at all, indicating a 
near zero shadow wage rate.
5 This is typically the state of affairs in any economy with 
“surplus” unskilled labor. Some Lesotho males work in the South African gold mines. 
From amongst the remaining, some are employed in the public sector; and some are 
employed in the modern, formal, skilled labor sector. The rest of the labor force is 
unemployed, engages in subsistence cattle farming, or is employed in the urban informal 
sector.
6 The labor markets, for skilled and unskilled workers, the availability of credit 
and infrastructure, and employment in the informal sector, collectively present intriguing 
phenomena in Lesotho which, to date, are not adequately understood. Hence arises the 
importance of the model for Lesotho that captures the Lesotho migrants in South Africa, 
the structure of forces that tend to keep Lesotho from experiencing economic 
 
4 Plath, Holland, and Carvalho (1987) found that improved agricultural practices, such as simple rotations 
of traditional field crops, held the potential to generate domestic income in excess of that offered to migrants 
in the South African Gold mines. 
5  On a very closely related issue, but for economies with large populations, see Lewis (1954) who 
explained why wages remained low and profits rose in both the early stages of the industrial revolution in 
Britain, and in the less developed countries in the first half or the twentieth century, by introducing the 
celebrated hypothesis of “unlimited supply of labor.” Indeed, he demonstrated that “the result is a dual 
(national or world) economy, where one part is a reservoir of cheap labor for the other. Unlimited supply of 
labor derives ultimately from population pressure, so it is a phase in the demographic cycle.” 
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development, and particularly identifies skill acquisition policies that will be effective 
and the ones that are doomed to failure. And why does this economy fail to experience 
growth in employment and productivity via increases in capital utilization, through 
domestic accumulation or foreign inflows? This is a fundamental question that must also 
be answered. For, without a clear understanding of the causes of underdevelopment, no 
serious policy recommendation can be made. 
The purpose of this paper is to explain the structure of forces that tend to keep 
Lesotho from experiencing economic development. We accomplish this by constructing 
what is essentially a dual-economy general equilibrium model along the lines of Lewis 
(1954), and Harris and Todaro (1970). However, in order to adequately model Lesotho’s 
large unskilled labor force’s inability to attain sufficient skills, such as reading, writing 
and basic machinery skills, to enter the formal labor market, we introduce a 
skill-acquisition function based on efficiency wage and hysterisis arguments. The insight 
into Lesotho’s labor market rigidities brought about from inclusion of the 
skill-acquisition function is the primary contribution of this paper.   
 
1.1.    Some Stylized Facts and Assumptions for the Model of Lesotho 
 
In 1998, approximately thirty per cent of the GNP of Lesotho came from the 
remittances from Lesotho men working in South African gold mines, and about six 
percent from the formal sector comprising of the blue jeans industry. Lesotho’s share of 
import tariff revenues collected by the South African Customs Union (SACU), and the 
royalties from South Africa for the water they receive from the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project, make up the rest, with virtually no agricultural income going through the 
market, and the informal sector contributing an undetermined amount. 
The state of affairs in Lesotho are those in any economy with “surplus” unskilled 
labor. Yet, when the government hires additional unskilled workers in the public sector, 
it pays a relatively high wage rate (certainly in excess of the zero shadow price of 
unskilled labor). This wage payment, and the public sector annual wage increases in the 
7-10% range achieved by Lesotho labor unions, essentially constitute transfer payments 
from the productive members of the society (including migrant workers in South Africa) 
to the less productive, unskilled workers. Naturally, such payments are a fiscal drain on 
the economy, and, unless there are productivity gains through education and training, or 
a large inflow of foreign capital, Lesotho is bound to experience a fiscal crisis that will 
deepen in the years to come. 
As noted, the key stylized facts that must be captured in the model for Lesotho are 
the Lesotho migrants in South Africa who send remittances back to Lesotho, the 
unskilled workers in the government sector, formal and informal sector employment, 
investment in human capital, and infrastructure investment that reduces transport costs. 
Very little income generation actually occurs in Lesotho. Further, the bulk of the 
commodities consumed in Lesotho are imported from South Africa. 
To incorporate these stylized facts we explicitly make the following assumptions. MAMIT DEME, DAVID FRANCK, AND NADEEM NAQVI  18
First, capital is internationally mobile into or out of the economy.
7 Further, the 
efficiency-wage hypothesis holds for the low-wage, unskilled workers in the informal 
sector since at very low wage rates, such as those that exist for the unskilled workers in 
the informal sector, mere needs of minimal nutrition, and, sometimes transportation 
costs, provide grounds for modeling the unskilled, informal structure in this manner.   
This general equilibrium model includes several additional features that are very 
specific to Lesotho. However, as we elaborate on this matter in later sections, the core 
model is general enough, so that, shorn of these particular details, it is applicable to 
many countries with small populations including Botswana and Namibia.
8 
The core stylized facts and the essential argument we construct are the following. 
The economy has a high-wage modern or formal sector that produces a small fraction of 
the country’s GNP. From this stylized fact we explicitly assume the modern sector 
employs  skilled labor. There is also a low-wage informal sector, which acts as a 
reservoir of effectively unlimited supply of unskilled workers. But these workers are not 
directly employable in the formal sector unless they are first transformed into skilled 
workers. Skill acquisition can occur at the expense of scarce resources. The technology 
of transforming unskilled into skilled labor is such that large doses of resources must be 
spent; small infusions do not work.
9 From this stylized fact we conclude there are 
discontinuities (lumpiness) in the skill acquisition process. At least this is the perception 
or conjecture of all existing and potential entrepreneurs and workers. The economy thus 
remains caught in a low-level equilibrium trap or a Nurkse (1953) equilibrium, not 
because there is any shortage of capital, but because there are limited supplies of skilled 
workers. Further, left to the labor markets, these supplies will not rise to their Pareto 
efficient levels. This is because the social rate of return on investment in education and 
training is greater than the private return, and because both entrepreneurs and workers 
fail to recognize the economy-wide benefits of small doses of investment in training that 
they can individually or jointly finance. Stated differently, in the production of skilled 
workers, there is a positive externality: it is the conjecture of all workers and firms that 
their gain from spending on education, training and skill-acquisition is less than the 
actual social gain.
10 We incorporate this stylized fact into the model in the form of the 
 
 
7 On international capital mobility in large-scale general equilibrium models see the work of Neary (1988, 
1985), Neary and Ruane (1988), and Chandra and Naqvi (1997), among others. On human capital investment 
in general equilibrium, see Findlay and Kierzkowoski (1983). 
8 The population of Botswana is about 1.6 million, and that of Namibia just over a million. Contrast this 
with the population of Bangladesh or Kenya. 
9 This is a very important assumption of our model. We describe below why we make this assumption and 
the role it plays in the model.   
10 This externality is precisely in the sense of Chipman (1970), who proved that free entry and exit and 
perfect competition are consistent in general equilibrium with external, or what he calls parametric, 
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assumption that the social rate of return on investment in education, training and skill 
acquisition is greater than the private return. In the formal sector, no single, competitive 
entrepreneur finances investment in training either alone or jointly with his employees. 
This is because he fails to recognize its economy-wide benefits. If, however, a critical 
mass of entrepreneurs or workers, or both, were to spend a large enough amount on 
training, the economy would leap out of this vicious circle of poverty.
11  In addition, and 
in line with the stylized facts above, we also assume that some Lesotho males are 
employed in South African gold mines, and they remit a portion of their income back to 
Lesotho.
12 
In the Section 2, we develop the core model based on the stylized facts described 
above, present the general equilibrium solutions to our model and introduce a 
skill-acquisition function into the model to capture the stylized fact of lumpiness 
observed in the technology of transforming unskilled into skilled labor.
13 This 
lumpiness is expressed in the form of a discontinuous step function. In Section 3 we 
posit some alternative development strategies for Lesotho. Section 4 summarizes out 
results and provides suggestions for future research.   
 
 
2.  THE  BASIC  MODEL 
 
2.1.    Model with a Fixed Supply of Skilled Workers 
 
Assume that an economy produces two goods, an informal sector output of 
Commodity 1 or food in the amount  1 x , and a formal sector output of Commodity 2 or 
cloth in the amount  . In the informal sector, capital in the quantity  , and unskilled 
labor in the amount  , are employed through a concave and linearly homogeneous 
technology. Domestically, unskilled workers earn a wage rate  . The formal sector 
also employs   quantity of capital, but with skilled labor in the amount  , again 
with concave and constant returns to scale (CRS) technology. In Sector 2, these workers 






2 K 2 S
. S w K  amount  of 
domestically (Lesotho) owned capital, whereas the capital in use in Lesotho is  K , so 
 
are mild and not very rapidly increasing. For, if the external increasing returns are very rapid, the production 
surface exhibits non-convexity, and the economy admits multiple competitive equilibria. 
11  Basu (1984, 1997) provides a particularly articulate discussion of the low-level equilibrium trap, 
Nurkse equilibrium and other poverty-trap equilibria. Also important here is the recent book by Ray (1998). 
12  In our analysis, we do, from time to time, consider the implications of relaxing some of these 
assumptions.  
13 The model in Section 2 is very general. From this setup, various special models can be developed to 
capture the unique characteristics of other countries. MAMIT DEME, DAVID FRANCK, AND NADEEM NAQVI  20
that  ( K K K − = *
) ( , ( 1 1 1 w e K F x =
). , ( 2 2 2 S K H x =
)  is the quantity of foreign owned (mostly South African and 
Chinese) capital employed in Lesotho. Lesotho is a small open economy both in world 
commodity and capital markets. Thus it takes the world commodity prices   
and the world return to capital   as parametrically determined on international 
commodity and capital markets. 
*, *, 2 1 p p
0
*, r
The production functions in the two sectors are, 
 




                                                     ( 2 )  
 
with the restrictions that both   and    are concave and homogeneous of degree 
one in both arguments, and that all marginal products are strictly positive but 
diminishing. This implies that all cross partials of the production functions are positive, 
or that capital and unskilled labor in Sector 1, and capital and skilled labor in Sector 2, 
are both cooperative factors. This essentially means that an increase in the employment 
of a factor in any sector raises the marginal product of the other factor employed in the 
same sector.
) ( F ) ( H
14 
The term pre-multiplying the employment of unskilled labor in the informal 
sector in (1) is the efficiency wage function  ) ( , 0 ) ( ), ( 1 1 1 < ′ ′ > ′ = w e w e w e e .
15 The 
efficiency-wage hypothesis has a long history. However, the approach we adopt here is 
that in Solow (1979), where he demonstrates that, at the optimum, the elasticity of the 








                                                         ( 3 )  
 
Equation (3) is commonly known as the Solow elasticity condition. It says that it is in 
the interest of the employer to pay that wage at which the additional gain in efficiency is 
exactly offset by the extra wage-payment cost. At very low wage rates, mere needs of 
minimal nutrition, and, sometimes, workers’ transport-costs, provide adequate 
justification for adopting this hypothesis.
16 Throughout we assume that the efficiency 
wage hypothesis holds for the informal sector workers. 
 
14 In addition, we assume that all inputs are indispensable. 
15 For empirical works related to efficiency wage see MacLeod et al. (1994). 
16 For more on this, see Dasgupta and Ray (1986), and Ray (1998). A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM SKILL ACQUISITIONS MODEL  21
Let   and   be the domestic prices of the two commodities in Lesotho, 
assumed fixed for now. We assume, for now, that  , where   is  the 
fixed cost of transporting goods between Lesotho and South Africa incurred in sector 
.
1 p 2 p
2 , 1 , * = + = i p p i i i τ i τ
i
17  The other relationships are the usual first order conditions of profit maximization, 
 




* ) , ( 2 2 1 r S K H p K = ,                                                   ( 5 )  
 
where (4) and (5) say that the values of marginal product of capital equal the given 
world rental rate of capital. If the domestic return to capital in Lesotho,  r , is greater 
than the world return,  * r , capital flows into Lesotho. On the other hand, if  * r r < , 
capital flows out of Lesotho, so that in capital market equilibrium,  * r r = , and  K  is 
fully employed. Therefore we have, 
 
K K K = + 2 1 ,                                                       ( 6 )  
 
with the requirement that  0 *= = dr dr . 
Similarly in the labor markets, 
 
1 1 1 1 ) , ( w L K F p L = ,                                                    ( 7 )  
 




G SA L G w L L G p = Ω + ) ; ( * 3 ,                                              ( 9 )  
 
where   is the gold production function in South Africa,   is the 
marginal product of labor in South African gold mines,   is the number of Lesotho 
workers employed there,   is the number of South African and other (non-Lesotho) 
workers employed there, and    is the South African wage rate paid to workers in the 
gold mines. We assume that    is fixed by miners’ unions in South Africa. Also, in (9), 
 is the fixed world price of gold, and 








* G p Ω  is the set of other inputs affecting the 
 
17 We later consider the implications of relaxing this assumption of fixed transport costs. MAMIT DEME, DAVID FRANCK, AND NADEEM NAQVI  22
output of gold.
18  
All that remains now is to add the Lesotho budget constraint, 
 
3 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 * * L w T K r x p x p c p c p SA α ε + + − + = + Γ + + ,                       ( 1 0 )  
 
and the requirement that every person’s marginal rate of indifferent substitution equals 











− =                                                       ( 1 1 )  
 
holds on the demand side. In (10) and (11),   is the consumption of good    i c , i α  is 
the fraction of Lesotho income earned from South African gold mines that is remitted to 
Lesotho,    is government expenditure that does not result in labor movement from the 
unskilled to the skilled labor force, and 
Γ
T  refers to all lump sum tax revenue of the 
government including duties collected by the South African Customs Union and the 
revenue from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. For now assume that  ε  is some 
arbitrary constant, and the number of skilled Lesotho workers at any given time is 
parametrically fixed at  2 S . We will, of course, relax this assumption later. Assume also 
that government spending and taxes are exogenously given. 
 
2.2.  Solving  the  Model 
 
To solve the model, first note that, given the Solow elasticity condition (3), from (4), 
(5), and (7) alone we obtain the general equilibrium values of   and   as 
functions of the parameters,   and 
1 2 1 , , w K K 1 L
* , , 2 1 r p p 2 S . By substituting these three variables in 
(1) and (2) we can independently solve for the output levels   and   in general 
equilibrium. Also, by substituting the same values in (8), we get the skilled wage rate as 
a functions of   and 
1 x 2 x
* , , 2 1 r p p 2 S . With the knowledge of   and  , from (6) we 
obtain the value of   and  therefore  of 
1 K 2 K
, K * K   as functions of these parameters and  K . 
Notice also that in (9), with given parametric values of   and  , the only 
variable is  , which can be solved for separately from this equation by itself as a 
function of only these latter parameters. And from (10) and (11), we obtain the values of 
, as functions of all parameters including 




2 , 1 , = i ci Γ α  and T . If one wishes to 
obtain the total number of unemployed Lesotho workers, it is simply  ) 3 2 L (L L − 1 L + + , 
where  L  is the total Lesotho labor force, and   equals a positive fraction of    2 L 2 S
 
18 Of course,    is homogenous of degree one in all factors, not just labor.  (.) GA GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM SKILL ACQUISITIONS MODEL  23
and is the number of unskilled workers who have acquired skills.
19 
The parameters of the model are  , , * , , 2 1 r p p , , , * Ω SA G L p G w K ,  2 S , , ,Γ α  and T . 
The endogenous variables determined in general equilibrium by the relationships of the 
model are  ,  ,  ,  , and  . In the general equilibrium solution, these 
are dependent on   and 




2 x 1 w S w
* p 2 S  only. Next,   is dependent on   and 
 only. And 
3 L , ,Ω p *, SA G L
G w * K , in general equilibrium, is a function of  , * r , , 2 1 p p 2 S , and K . 
Finally,   and c   are functions of all parameters. To summarize, in our model there are 
eleven relationships in eleven endogenous variables,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , 
1 c 2
, , 2 1 K K 1 L 1 x 2 x 1 w S w * K , 
,   and c . Of course, as noted above,    equals a positive fraction of  . 3 L 1 c 2 2 L 2 S
20 
 
2.3.    Skill Acquisition Step Function   
 
So far we have assumed a fixed number of skilled Lesotho workers,  2 2 S S =
() = π ,
. As 
noted above, stylized labor rigidities present a significant difficulty for Lesotho’s 
economic development and, therefore, we now assume instead that Lesotho’s labor 
market is characterized by the skill acquisition function, which is    = ε 2 2 S S
 
0, if    ,         R e g i m e   1  
0 0 ε ε < <
 
2 S , if    ,       R e g i m e   2                                   ( 1 2 )  
2 0 ε ε ε < ≤
 
2 S , if    ,      Regime  3,  and 
3 2 ε ε ε < ≤
 
) ( π ε ψ + , if    .     Regime 4 
3 ε ε ≥
 
In (12),  , are exogenously specified values, 
3 2 0 0 ε ε ε < < < ε  is  public expenditure on 
education, training and skill-acquisition, and π  is private expenditure on the same 
activity, with  0 > ) ( + ′ π ε ψ . The skill acquisition function posited above in (12) is 
presented in Figure 1, and warrants further comment. 
The first property to note about the particular form of the skill-acquisition function 
we have adopted in the model for Lesotho is that, in the range of government 
expenditure on education, training and skill-acquisition,  , it is a rising step 
3 0 ε ε < <
 
19  We later introduce an exogenously specified skill acquisition technology to endogenize  , and 
therefore,  . 
2 S
2 L
20 We follow the convention that the initial general equilibrium values of a generic endogenous variable 
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function, but for larger values it is a smoothly rising function. We have deliberately 
adopted this form to take account of the externality mentioned above. It is precisely 
because workers and employers in the formal sector do not take into account the 
economy-wide productivity gains of investment in education, training and 
skill-acquisition that they fail to undertake this expenditure. Also, it has been found 
empirically, that the employability of workers in formal sector activities becomes 
possible only after attaining a tenth grade education in South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, 
and Namibia.
21 If there is an increase in government expenditure that creates a 
widespread increase in education levels of workers from, say, the fifth to the ninth grade, 
it does not transform unskilled workers in to sufficiently skilled to be employable in the 
formal sector. This assumption, that large doses of investment in education, training and 
skill-acquisition are required, and that small infusions do not do the trick, is captured in 
the step-function nature of the skill-acquisition function in (12). Finally, of course, if 
there is a sufficiently high government expenditure on education, training and 
skill-acquisition, so that there is a large enough skilled labor force in the economy, in 
Regime 4, the externality becomes so weak as to not matter at all. From this point 
onwards,  , public and private expenditure on education, training and 
skill-acquisition become perfect substitutes, and the skills-acquisition function becomes 
a differentiable, smooth function,  . 
3 ε ε ≥
) ( 2 π ε ψ + = S
 
 
3.  ALTERNATIVE  DEVELOPMENT  STRATEGIES 
 
We next provide some diagrams to facilitate the understanding of the key features of 
our model. This proves particularly helpful both for extending the model in several ways, 
including the addition of public-sector employment of unskilled labor, and for 
ascertaining the macroeconomic consequences of alternative development strategies. 
Figure 1 displays the skill-acquisition function, OS, described in (12). Let  ε  be  the 
exogenously determined public expenditure on education, training and skill-acquisition 
in the initial general equilibrium. To this corresponds a skilled labor force of  2 S , and 
) ( # ˆ
2 2 S L = . Of course, demand conditions matter. However, given the severe shortage of 
skilled/educated labor in Lesotho from and economic standpoint, this demand is 
virtually unlimited. Therefore, the production of too many skilled workers in Lesotho is 
not a problem that imposes a binding constraint. Further, the unskilled Lesotho workers 
employed in South African gold mines are  , which is 
determined by economic forces outside Lesotho. Then, as indicated in Figure 2, the 
Lesotho labor force is O
) , , *, ( ˆ
3 3 Ω = SA SA G L w p L L
1O2, or L , so that  3 ˆ L L −  is the number available for 
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employment in Lesotho. Of these,  , determined by  2 2 ˆ L O′ 2 S
w
(skilled workers) in Figure 
1, are employed in the formal sector. The skilled wage rate,  , can be read off point M. 
Informal sector employment is  , and the wage rate is  , at which the Solow 
(1979) elasticity condition (3) is satisfied. Clearly, the line segment   is the 
magnitude of unemployment in Lesotho. 
S ˆ
1 1 ˆ L O 1 ˆ w
















The step function OS, which is the graph of Equation (12), relates the supply or production of skilled workers 
as a function of public expenditure on education, training and skill acquisition. The vertical line at  ε  gives 
the level of current public expenditure on education in Lesotho. Corresponding to this expenditure level, the 
number of skilled Basotho workers is  S . 
 
Figure 1.  Skill  Acquisition  Process 
 
 
With everything else unchanged, suppose the government increases expenditure on 
education, training and skill-acquisition from  ε  to ε . As Figure 1 indicates, this 
does not increase the number of skilled workers in Lesotho, and the macroeconomic 
impact on both unemployment and GNP is nothing. This is because, as pointed out 
earlier, it is not productive to construct half a school or a quarter of a training institute.   MAMIT DEME, DAVID FRANCK, AND NADEEM NAQVI  26
 






















The Basotho labor force is O1O2, or  L . The number of Basotho working in South Africa is  , so that  3 L
3 L L −  is the number available for employment in Lesotho. Of these,  , determined by  2 2 ˆ L O′ 2 S  (skilled 
workers) in Figure 1, are employed in the formal sector. The skilled wage rate,  , can be read off point M. 
Informal sector employment is O , and the wage rate is  , at which the Solow (1979) elasticity 
condition is satisfied. Clearly, the line segment    is the magnitude of unemployment in Lesotho. 
S w ˆ
1 1ˆ L 1 ˆ w
1 ˆ L 2 ˆ L
 
Figure 2.    Labor Markets in Lesotho 
 
 
On the other hand, if the government increases spending on education, training and 
skill-acquisition from  ε  to ε , there is an increase in the skilled Lesotho labor force 
from  2 S  to  2 S . This increases total employment in Lesotho by  . 0
~ ˆ
2 2 > − L L  
Naturally, the unemployment rate falls, and the GNP of Lesotho rises. However, as a 
glance at Figure 1 indicates, this policy shift, while large enough to make some dent in 
the unemployment rate, does not pull the economy out of the low-level equilibrium 
trap. For, any additional, small increases in education, training and skill-acquisition A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM SKILL ACQUISITIONS MODEL  27
expenditure will again have no positive effect on employment or national income. 
Notice also that the size of the informal sector does not undergo any dramatic change 
when the formal sector grows due to a shift from  ε  to ε . It is quite clear, however, 
that if there is a sufficiently large increase in public expenditure to a magnitude 
, then the informal sector contracts, the formal sector expands, and the economy 
of Lesotho reaches a full employment equilibrium. In this new equilibrium, Lesotho 
has broken out of the vicious circle of poverty. Further, in this new equilibrium, there 
is no need for the government to increase education, training and skill-acquisition 
spending - the private sector can take over, because public and private spending 
become perfect substitutes. 
3 ε ε ≥
Similarly, we can analyze the macroeconomic impact of other policy changes, 
including, but not limited to, the employment- income- and poverty-effects of a switch 
in expenditure from public sector employment to education, training and 
skill-acquisition, or of a change in the world price of gold. 
 
 
4.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
 
We developed a general equilibrium model for Lesotho, and obtained the solutions 
to a rising step skill acquisition function. The results of the skill-acquisition function 
suggest that Lesotho can break out of its low-growth traps only with significant 
improvement in skills, both in terms of the number of skilled workers and the quality of 
the skills they acquire. The policy implication of these finding is that government and 
the private sector should invest on skill acquisition beyond the ninth grade level to 
transform the unskilled labor force into a skilled labor force. To achieve this goal, a 
significant amount of resources have to be allocated to human-capital investment. 
The model constructed in this paper has a notable difference with Todaro’s education 
model. Todaro’s model suggests that developing countries need to make primary 
education their optimal goal, and that, educating the population beyond the eighth grade 
level will be socially sub-optimal. On the contrary, our model of a rising step 
skill-acquisition function suggests that the optimal strategy would be to provide education 
that extends beyond the ninth grade level to a very large proportion of the labor force.   
We allow foreign capital (a complementary resource to labor) to be endogenously 
determined through the exogenously specified skill acquisition function. Studies of 
unemployment in developing countries show a persistent unemployment and 
underemployment among the educated. However, as Upadhyay (l993) effectively 
expressed it, in these countries, the proportion of the educated labor force to the total 
labor force is extremely low by any standard. A country characterized by a large mass of 
uneducated and unskilled workers has a small chance of inducing foreign investment 
and capital inflow in general. Hence, the study in this paper views skill acquisition a 
necessary step towards economic progress.   
Other findings of the model include the following. Skill acquisitions would allow the MAMIT DEME, DAVID FRANCK, AND NADEEM NAQVI  28
formal sector to attract foreign capital, and to increase employment. Wages fall in the formal 
sector without changing in the informal sector. Production in both the formal and informal 
sectors rise, but it rises negligibly in the informal sector. In general, changes in the informal 
sector would be zero or negligible while the formal sector undergoes major transform. 
The stickiness of wage rates of the skilled labor in developing countries is not 
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